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27 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Review of Overflight Reconnaissance

1. Attached for your information are papers on the above subject prepared by Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy Director (Intelligence), Central Intelligence Agency, in response to a request of the Director of Central Intelligence. These papers in a draft form were reviewed by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance at its meeting of 16 July and proposed changes were made.

2. These papers, it is understood, were considered by the Special Group at its meeting on 19 July, its decision on them being recorded in the Minute of the Special Group meeting of that date.

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James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachments:
Subject Papers

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Copies 2, 3--State TCO
4--DIA
5, 6, 7--DIA TCO
8--OACSI TCO
9--ONI TCO
10, 11--AFCIN TCO
12, 13--NSA TCO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Photographic Reconnaissance of Priority Strategic Target Areas in Communist China Other Than in the Taiwan Straits Buildup Area and South China

1. At your direction, with the assistance of all Central Intelligence Agency components concerned, I reviewed the outstanding USIB requirements for overhead reconnaissance of priority strategic target areas in Communist China other than in the Taiwan Straits buildup area and South China. This review took into account the overall substantive intelligence picture, the contribution of other sources and the continuing need for the type of information that may be expected from this activity. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has considered this report on the program for reconnaissance and concurs with it.

25X1C 2. Since the beginning of the program in January
25X1C 1962, there have been five U-2 missions [redacted] over priority strategic targets in China other than in the Taiwan Straits buildup area and South China.

3. This photography has furnished intelligence of great value which was unavailable from other sources:

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

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

4. Additional intelligence is needed which, particularly in view of the relative paucity of information from other sources, requires U-2 photography to supply:

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

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

5. At present there is little risk from hostile action over China except in the few areas where operational SA-2 missile sites are deployed. The Chinese Communists track U-2 flights accurately but have no present capability for air interception. This relative invulnerability of the U-2 may be comparatively short-lived; it will certainly be reduced if additional SA-2 missiles are deployed.

*6. It is recommended that we proceed immediately with coverage of the remainder of the strategic targets in Northeast China, completing the task about one-half done by the very successful [redacted] One additional mission will probably accomplish this. Next it is recommended that the highest priority targets in Central China not previously photographed, principally the Szechwan Basin, be covered. It is possible that two missions, achieved under optimum conditions, could accomplish this and thereby complete initial coverage of all the highest priority strategic targets in China. Certain of the strategic targets in China, particularly the missile test range and the Lanchow area, may require subsequent coverage but it is recommended that determination of this requirement await study of the intelligence resulting from the complete initial coverage.

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RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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

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[redacted]

* The State Department concurs in the statement of the requirements and the order of priority indicated. However, the Department of State representative abstains from the recommendations inasmuch as the recommendations imply political approval which is beyond his competence.

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[redacted]

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